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THE ARGUMENT FROM DESIRE 
Robert Holyer 
In this essay I offer a reformulation and defense of the argument from desire as it is 
presented in the works of C. S. Lewis. Specifically, I try to answer the criticisms of the 
argument made by John Beversluis in his recent book C. S. Lewis and the Search for 
Rational Religion. However, my concern is not so much Lewis as it is the argument 
itself, which I argue is worthy of serious and more extended philosophical treatment. 
In his critical discussion of C. S. Lewis's case for Christianity, John Beversluis 
extracts from Lewis's writings something he calls the argument from desire. I 
Although Lewis himself never presented it as a philosophical argument, he did 
insinuate it at several points in his writings, especially in the autobiographical 
works, The Pilgrim's Regress and Surprised by Joy, and it was arguably the 
most important consideration in his own conversion. What Beversluis does is to 
present this facet of Lewis's development as a philosophical argument, which 
he then goes on to reject for both "logical and theological" reasons. In what 
follows I shall consider Lewis's argument only from a philosophical point of 
view. My intention is to reformulate and defend it, and this not primarily to 
vindicate Lewis from what I think are some superficial criticisms (though I hope 
that what I have to say will have this effect), but more importantly, because I 
think Lewis offers us in rough form an argument from religious experience that 
is both different from the one that is most commonly discussed and deserving 
of a more careful philosophical treatment than it receives from Beversluis. 
The argument from desire comprises several insights Lewis came to over the 
years that enabled him to understand one of the central concerns of his life, the 
experience of what he called Joy. What Lewis called Joy, and what others have 
called Sehnsucht (a term Lewis himself used), melancholy, ecstatic wonder or 
romantic longing, is not easy to describe; in essence, it is an intense longing or 
desire which, though unsatisfied, "is itself more desirable than any other satisfac-
tion."2 Because it is unsatisfied, "it might almost equally well be called a particular 
kind of unhappiness or grief."3 So there are in effect two essential elements of 
Joy: a sort of rapturous desire and a sense of being separated or alienated from 
the object of desire. Lewis, of course, was not alone in the attention he devoted 
to these feelings. If Corbin Scott Carnell is correct, they "may be said to represent 
just as much a basic theme in literature as love . . ."4 
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For my purpose, what is most interesting about Joy is that it is in no obvious 
sense religious. To be sure, the sort of desire that is part of Joy is also one of 
the constituent elements of the experience of the holy, the one Rudolf Otto 
identified as fascination. 5 However, Joy lacks precisely what Otto regarded as 
essential to the holy, and that is a sense of the divine presence. As Lewis 
described it, Joy is not an awareness of God's presence; it is simply an unfulfilled 
desire, and it is not in any obvious sense a desire for God. What is more, it can 
be experienced along with, and is in some sense similar to, some other desires, 
such as the desire for beauty, sexual desire and romantic love; and consequently, 
it is often difficult to distinguish it from them. Also, whatever the object of Joy 
is, it is not something given in our experience. The conclusion reached by many 
who have experienced it is that it is a desire for that which lies beyond what we 
now experience, a desire for an unknown but ultimately satisfying something. 
Lewis himself experienced Joy for a number of years before he came to believe 
that it has any theological import. In fact, to discover what it was a desire for 
was the substance of his spiritual search. However, though Joy may be mixed 
in with our other desires and difficult to distinguish from them, it is a distinct 
desire: it is not just a desire for an ultimate degree of satisfaction of our other 
desires. 
The insights Lewis came to in his quest for Joy may be summarized by three 
arguments which together constitute the argument from desire. 6 
Since all natural' desires are desires for an object that satisfies them, 
Joy is a desire for some object. 
2 Joy is not a desire for any finite object, since no finite object satisfies 
it. 
3 Since all desires have existents that satsify them, Joy too has an 
existent which satisfies it. Therefore, (combined with 2) an infinite 
object exists. 
To examine the argument and Beversluis's objections to it, I shaH consider each 
component in tum. 
Although 1 came as something of a discovery to Lewis, Beversluis accepts it 
simply as "an observation about the nature of desire." (16) What he means by 
this is not immediately clear. Apparently he accepts it only as a definitional 
truth: what we call a desire is always a desire for something. Accordingly 1 is 
simply a statement of how we use the term desire correctly: it needs an object. 
However, Beversluis argues, we cannot draw any existential conclusions from 
this "grammatical" truism. 
Although this is certainly correct, it misses Lewis's point completely. Lewis 
well knew that all desires have objects in the grammatical sense. The real issue 
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for him was something else. One of the mistakes he discovered in his own 
experience was the belief that Joy was a desire for the experience of Joy, that 
it was quite simply a desire for a certain state of mind. If we look closely at the 
nature of Joy it is easy to see how Lewis made this mistake. If it is an unsatisfied 
desire which is itself desirable, it would easily seem that what is desirable is the 
state of having the desire aroused but unsatisfied. The conviction Lewis came 
to through his reading of Samuel Alexander's Space, Time and Deity was that 
all desires are desires for some external object that satisfies them. Consequently, 
Joy too must be a desire for some external object and not for a state of mind. 
Accordingly, we would have to replace 1 with 
1 ' Since all natural desires are desires for an external object that dis-
atisfies them, Joy too is a desire for some external object. 
Although l' better captures Lewis's point and what is necessary for the argument 
from desire, it is not at all clear that its major premiss, All desires are desires 
for some external object, is true. There are many examples of desires that seem 
to be desires for a certain state of mind. I should think that some people who 
take drugs or get drunk do so desiring a certain state of mind. Presumably, many 
people seek professional psychological care, hoping to achieve a specific state 
of mind. And in everyday speech we can find many sentences that seem to 
indicate a desire for a certain state of mind-for example, many people claim 
that they want peace of mind. Moreover, it is not at all clear that desires are 
only desires for certain external objects. They are more commonly a desire both 
for some external state of affairs and also for some state of mind which should 
result from it. The man who is hungry, for example, desires not only food but 
the cessation of hunger pains because he has eaten. In fact, only if the pains 
cease after eating are we convinced that he was hungry. As we shall see in 
discussion of 2, this is a crucial issue for Lewis. 
In light of this, we should perhaps replace l' by 
1" Since all natural desires are desires both for some external object 
and a corresponding mental state that results from it, Joy is a desire 
both for an external object and a corresponding mental state that is 
the result of it. 
Although there are still some ambiguities in 1", I think some further refinement 
of it will serve not only to articulate Lewis's insights, but also to accommodate 
the objections that can be raised to 1. It is certainly debatable that the desire for 
a drug-induced state of mind is a "natural" desire; even if it is, it could be argued 
that it does not deny the major premiss of 1" since drugs produce their effects 
by altering our perceptions of external states of affairs. And of the many cases 
where we seem to desire a certain state of mind, it could be argued that what 
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we really desire is a state of mind that we should have as the result of an existing 
state of affairs, but do not. In other words, I should think that some version of 
I" might be defensible. 
However, Lewis's remarks are subject to another interpretation, and it may 
well be that what his argument requires is nothing as universal as the major 
premiss of I". Perhaps all Lewis claimed~ and all that is needed is 
1'" Joy is either a desire for a state of mind or for an external object. 
Since it is not desire for a state of mind, it is a desire for an external 
object. 
I know of no objection to the major premiss. I suspect the most important question 
would be how one could establish the minor premiss. Lewis claimed that he had 
come to know it on the basis of experience, in particular his failure to find that 
the experience of Joy fulfilled his desire. This of course raises all the issues 
raised by 2, since the evidence Lewis had for 2 was of a piece with the evidence 
he had for the minor premiss of 1"'. So it is to an examination of 2 that we are 
naturally led. Suffice it to say that if 2 is true, so is the minor premiss of 1"'. 
The concerns that lie behind 2 become relevant once one accepts some version 
of 1. That is, if Joy is a desire for something, even in the grammatical sense, 
the next appropriate question is a desire for what. Lewis sought to answer this 
on the basis of experience. He attempted to satisfy his desire by appropriating 
those objects that seemed to evoke it. What he claimed to discover was that 
none of the objects that evoked the desire actually satisfied it. In other words, 
though the objects that evoked Joy may have satisfied some desire, they did not 
satisfy the desire he called Joy. Consequently, Lewis claimed to come to know 
2 by a process of elimination in which he tried any likely means of satisfying 
his desire only to find that none of them sufficed. 
Though Beversluis sees the plausibility of Lewis's case, he does not think 
that Lewis has given us a satisfactory account of how we can sort out our desires 
to determine their real objects. He observes: 
Lewis thought that anyone who took these experiences seriously and 
pursued each object of desire would discover that they do not ultimately 
satisfy. And from this he concluded without further ado that they are 
not what we really want. (16) 
Having summarized what he takes to be Lewis's view, he then rejects it, arguing 
this. 
The claim Anything that does not ultimately satisfy us cannot be what 
we really wanted may sound plausible when stated in so general a way, 
but it cannot survive the test of concrete examples. Would anyone 
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seriously want to argue that the fact that Sam is hungry again four hours 
after breakfast proves that it is not food that he really wanted? Or that 
the fact that Jill is tired by 10:00 a.m. proves that it was not sleep that 
she really wanted? How, then, can such a conclusion follow in the case 
of our experiences of Joy? Why say that the failure of music or poetry 
to satisfy us fully proves that they are not really what we want? (16) 
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Beversluis's argument is surely correct, and if he accurately summarizes Lewis's 
views, he has certainly put his finger on a major blunder. However, I doubt that 
he is giving us a faithful reading of Lewis. No doubt, you can find statements 
in Lewis that come close to: if x does not ultimately satisfy S, then x is not what 
S really wanted. However, I think Lewis summarizes his view more accurately 
when he says, "Do what we will, then, we remain conscious of a desire which 
no natural happiness will satisfy. "9 What this suggests and what his examples 
bear out is the claim that finite objects satisfy some of our desires (those whose 
combined satisfaction he might call "natural happiness") without satisfying Joy. 
In other words, that x does not satisfy S's desire for Joy means x is not the object 
of Joy. This is perfectly consistent with the claim that x may satisfy some of 
S's other desires, and it does not entail the erroneous proposition that Beversluis 
attributes to Lewis. So I fail to see that Lewis is guilty of quite the blunder 
Beversluis attributes to him. 
But suppose he were. Suppose he gave us an erroneous account of the criteria 
for making judgments like 2, or suppose (as I think to be the case) that he offers 
us no account of the criteria. What important conclusions follow? What really 
is Beversluis's point? Is it that Lewis was wrong to claim that we can sift through 
our desires and find their true objects? But obviously we do. Those who wish 
to lose weight, for example, must often determine whether their desire for food 
is really hunger or something else. And a man and a woman contemplating 
marriage would be wise to come to some understanding of the real nature of the 
desire they have for one another. These sorts of judgments are not always easy 
to make, but we do make them. Or is Beversluis's point that the evidence we 
should consult in making them is something other than the satisfactions we 
experience? But surely satisfactions are important evidence, though perhaps not 
in the simple way he pillories. So, for example, while it is not the case that 
Sam's hunger four hours after breakfast proves that he was not really hungry, 
his hunger one hour after what is for him a normal-sized breakfast is prima facie 
evidence that his desire for food is something other than hunger. And of course 
satisfactions may not be the only evidence to consider. Lewis several times refers 
to what he thought about the possible objects of Joy, and if we were to tease 
out of his highly metaphorical descriptions a set of criteria for making for 2, it 
would not be difficult to find more than Beversluis did. But admitting that we 
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do not find in Lewis an adequate account of the relevant criteria 2, perhaps 
Beversluis's point is that Lewis, or anyone else, cannot possibly know 2 without 
giving such an account. If this is his point, I fail to find it very convincing. A 
man's failure to give a satisfactory account of how we come to our perceptual 
beliefs is surely no reason to impugn his claim to know, say, that he is sitting 
in the library. Analogously, I see nothing in the absence of a satisfactory account 
of how we come to judgments like 2 that would impugn Lewis's (or anyone 
else's) claim to know it. 
But it may be that Beversluis's objection lies elsewhere. Perhaps what he is 
driving at is this. Joy is not a desire for a distinct kind of satisfaction: it is merely 
the desire for a whole number of things which taken together are ultimately and 
completely satisfying. In other words, Joy is not a desire for an infinite object, 
but for a sum total of finite objects-what is better called a desire for a completely 
satisfying life. Thus, the fact that some finite object is not in itself ultimately 
satisfying is not to say that it is not part of what is. If this is so, then we can 
admit the reality of Joy but deny that it suggests any theological conclusions. 
While I do not know that this is Beversluis's point, it is an important objection 
and must be addressed. 
The response to it that is most faithful to Lewis's thought is to say that we 
learn through experience that Joy is simply not the desire for a sum total satis-
faction of our other desires. In the passage I quoted above (p. ???) Lewis drew 
a distinction between Joy and what he called a desire for "natural happiness," 
claiming that we know by experience that the two are distinct. Lewis's response, 
then, would seem to be that the experience of Joy itself, if carefully attended 
to, will convince us that it is not simply a desire for a sum total satisfaction of 
our other desires. However, though I do not think Lewis would, one may well 
accept the claim about the nature of Joy without sacrificing the argument. Insofar 
as the objection recognizes Joy as an identifiable desire, it seems to concede the 
point that as a desire for an ultimately satisfying life it is distinct from the specific 
desires for specific parts of that life. Moreover, though the theological conclusions 
do not follow as immediately, one could recast the argument to show that a life 
of ultimate happiness requires a God. In this case 2 would have to give way to 
2' Joy is not a desire for a single object, but for ultimate happiness. 
However, since ultimate happiness is not possible without a God, 
Joy is in a sense also a desire for God. 
Of course, 2' would need further support. My intent is not to offer that support, 
but simply to suggest that, given the two options I have sketched, the objection 
need not undermine 2. 
A final possibility is that Beversluis' s point is simply that Lewis has not proven 
2. But, so far as I know, he never claimed to. What he claimed was that it is 
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true and that he had come to know it by sorting through his desires. Beyond 
this, he offers us the assurance that we too will come to know it if we will put 
it to the test as he did. What is more, Lewis was not alone in making these 
claims; if we consult others who have written about their experiences of Joy, 
we find that many of them also claim to know 2.10 And apart from possibly 
pointing out an ambiguity, Beversluis offers us nothing that should lead us to 
believe that Lewis and others do not know 2. Consequently, what I offer in 
support of 2 shall consist only of two observations about the sort of evidence 
relevant to it. First, by the nature of the claim, it would seem that the most 
impOliant evidence for it (or against it) is first-person experience. To be in the 
best position to verify 2, one would have to have experiences of Joy and also 
attempt to satisfy them. In this sense, one's evaluation of 2 would be very much 
person-related, which is perhaps a feature common to arguments from religious 
experience, not a peculiarity of the argument from desire. And of course, insofar 
as one's experience tends to disconfirm 2 the argument from desire may become 
an argument against the existence of God. Then again, Lewis does not offer the 
argument from desire as person-related in the sense that he thought 2 was true 
only for certain kinds of people. His claim for 2 is that we will discover its truth 
experientially. In this sense he claims a certain universality for 2: it can and 
should be verified by anyone who will honestly put it to the test. But this does 
not mean it can be verified by argument, and perhaps one of the reasons Lewis 
never presented the argument from desire as a philosophical proof was that he 
recognized that a crucial part of it could not be established argumentatively. 
Perhaps the best way of convincing someone of 2 is to help him clarify his 
experiences of Joy, and it is something like this that Lewis had in mind in 
Surprised by Joy and why Beversluis is correct to seein this work an "implicit 
argument" and "apologetic implications." Second, given that people other than 
Lewis claim to know 2, would it be appropriate for someone to accept it largely 
on the basis of testimony? Certainly we do accept judgments like it on that basis. 
For example, it is often said that money will not bring happiness, and some 
people choose a certain way of life because they have accepted this on the 
testimony of others. And we generally think that they are wise to do so. In fact, 
the whole wisdom tradition is based on the acceptance of judgments like 2 based 
initially at least on testimony. Of course all relevant kinds of testimony should 
be considered. But, recognizing the complexity here, I see no reason why in 
principle testimony is not good evidence for or against 2, and no reason why 
the argument from desire should lack some cogency for one who has little 
first-hand experience of Joy. 
Considering the argument from desire as a whole, 3 is perhaps the most crucial 
part, and it is here that Beversluis focuses most of his philosophical criticism. 
If we combine 3 with the results of 2 we can cast the argument in standard form 
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as follows: 
3a All natural desires have existing objects that they are desires for. 
3b Joy is a natural desire for an infinite object. 
3c Therefore, an infinite object exists. 
The point of Beversluis's attack is the truth of the major premiss, which he 
denies for two different reasons. 
First, he apparently construes Lewis's argument as a deductive argument, the 
major premiss of which is a universal affirmative proposition. However, he asks, 
"How could Lewis know that every natural desire has a real object before knowing 
that Joy has one?" (19) In other words, he asserts that we could never know 3a 
unless we also knew 3c, and if we know 3c why do we need an argument with 
it as a conclusion? The only justification for 3a that Beversluis can find in Lewis's 
writings is the claim that "Nature does nothing in vain." And the only justification 
he can find for this is a theory of natural law. So he concludes: "It begins to 
look as if Lewis arrived at his belief that every natural desire has a real object 
on the basis of nonempirical considerations, that he has smuggled into his argu-
ment a covert metaphysical theory of desire about which we have not been 
informed." (19) 
Beversluis is indeed correct; 3 does fail as a deductive argument. What he 
fails to consider is that it may very well succeed as an inductive argument. If 
we know that 3a is true of all natural desires except Joy (in which case it would 
be amended to read "Most" rather than "All"), if we do not know that Joy does 
not have an object, and if 3b is the case, then we have an inductive argument 
that renders 3c highly probable. It is understandable that Beversluis should miss 
this possibility, for Lewis often speaks as though we could establish 3a the same 
way we establish 3c, arguing from the existence of a desire to the existence of 
an object that satisfies it. And Beversluis is again correct in his criticism: the 
fact that we are hungry does nothing by itself to establish the conclusion that 
there is food. However. if we know empirically (as indeed we do) that food 
exists and that it satisfies hunger, and if we know this of all other desires as 
well, we have a strong inductive argument for 3c. In other words, I fail to see 
that the fallacious principal, the existence of a desire proves that there exists 
some object to satisfy it, is at all necessary to Lewis's argument. In fact, I am 
arguing it can survive nicely without it. 
The second criticism that Beversluis levels at 3c is the observation that not 
all natural desires have existing objects that satisfy them. Though in general 
food satisfies hungers, there are many people who never have sufficient food. 
Here Lewis adds a helpful qualification, claiming in effect that it is not the case 
that every actual natural desire has an object that satisfies it, but that for every 
type of desire there is an existing type of object that satisfies it. In other words, 
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the crucial relationship for 3a is between, say, hunger and food, not between 
actual instances of hunger and actual instances of eating. Accordingly, we should 
perhaps replace 3a with 
3a' For any type of natural desire there is a class of real objects that 
satisfy it. 
and 3b with 
3b' Joy is a type of natural desire for an infinite object. 
Beversluis makes very little of this qualification, but it suffices to save the 
argument from an obvious objection. 
However, though 3a' is not obviously false in the sense in which 3a is, is it 
true? Most of our desires would seem to confirm it. The challenge would be to 
look carefully at those desires that apparently do not. For example, do we have 
a desire for perfection and is this a type of desire in the relevant sense? Here 
we would get into some murky waters. For example, is the desire for perfection 
a distinct type of desire or merely a quality of other types of desire? I am inclined 
to think that it is the latter, for in most cases our desire for perfection is a desire 
for something that perfectly satisfies some other desire-for example, the perfect 
meal. But if it is a distinct desire, do we find objects that satisfy it? Apparently 
there are perfect proofs, but so far nothing you could call the perfect society or 
the perfect cantata. Obviously there is a great deal more that needs to be said 
about our desire for perfection, and there are other possible exceptions to 3a', 
for example, the desire for immortality. My point is simply that the way to 
weaken 3 as an inductive argument is to show that there are such exceptions. 
However, even if these exceptions exist, they do not disprove 3 but merely 
weaken it. And given the number of cases that seem to confirm it, I doubt that, 
even in weakening it, the challenger would be able to empty it of all force. 
So far as I can tell, the only other way to weaken 3 is to challenge 3b': is 
Joy a natural desire sufficiently like other desires? Here two distinct issues could 
be raised. First, how widespread does the experience of Joy have to be in order 
to qualify as a natural desire? This would be a difficult challenge to sustain or 
to meet, since one can have only a very impressionistic sense of how widespread 
this desire actually is. But if Carnell is correct to claim that it is as basic a theme 
in literature as love, it is difficult to believe that this sort of challenge has much 
chance of success. Second, one could question the extent to which Joy is like 
other natural desires. Perhaps a challenger could argue that the fact that Joy is 
desirable even though it is unfulfilled is a feature that makes it significantly 
unlike other desires. However, even if the challenger has some success with this 
line of argument, the most he could do is to diminish the similarity between Joy 
and other natural desires and hence weaken the argument. The fact that it is still 
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a desire, albeit of a somewhat different sort, would seem to limit the extent to 
which this sort of challenge could vitiate the argument. 
If my analysis is correct, the argument from desire may survive as an inductive 
argument of indeterminate force (maybe what Lewis called "a pretty good indi-
cation") for one who knows 2 or thinks it probable either on the basis of first-hand 
ex.perience or testimony. In many ways 2 is the crucial part of the argument. 
What I have argued is that Beversluis has not offered us good reasons to impugn 
claims to know it. An appropriate challenge of it would consist of a significantly 
different interpretation of the experience of Joy, one that denied it any theological 
force whatsoever. Though 3 can be challenged on a number of fronts, I think 
there are limits to how successful the challenges can be. 
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